

# Result Provenance in Named Function Networking

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*ACM ICN 2020, Montréal / virtual format · September 30, 2020*

# A Primer on Named Function Networking

- ICN/NDN with *named data* and *named functions*

`/data/alice /data/bob /func/wordCount /func/maximum`

- Computation expressions: applications of named functions on named data


`/func/maximum( /func/wordCount(/data/alice), /func/wordCount(/data/bob) )`

- In-network expression reduction (NFN-capable nodes)


*Evaluation:* computing result of function applications

*Orchestration:* where to place which (sub-) computation?


## Example: NFN Orchestration + Evaluation




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
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## Example: NFN Orchestration + Evaluation



- NFN mindset
- Security Challenge: Result Correctness
- Approach: Provenance Transparency
- Meta-Data: Provenance Records
- Provenance-Based Result Verification
- Ongoing and Future Work
- Conclusion



## Result Correctness

- Good news: Convenient computation service for applications
- Bad news: NFN as a whole must be trusted that...
  - Evaluation *rules* are followed
  - Evaluation based on specified *data*
- NFN result correctness is subject to extensive trust
  
- Goal of this work: Relaxed trust assumptions
  
- Approach: Log “genesis” of results in *provenance records*
  - Make involved computing entities (CE) traceable
  - Clients assess their trustworthiness


## Provenance of Results in NFN

- Provenance meta-data in general<sup>1</sup>: DAG capturing a) *involved elements* (data, processes, hw/sw environment,.. ), and b) their *relationships*.
- *Provenance Records (PR)* in NFN: Capture for each computation step:
  - a) Identity of CE (public key)
  - b) Signatures and PRs of all inputs (data+function)
  - c) `hmac( result )`
  - d) `hmac( a + b + c + expression )`


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<sup>1</sup>L. Carata et al. 2014. *A primer on provenance*. Communications of the ACM 57.


## Example Revisited



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# Example Revisited



# Provenance-Based Result Verification

## Input:

- PRs of all (sub-) computations
- list of trusted CEs

## Steps:

- All involved CEs are trusted? (*False* → *result untrusted*)
- All statement-hmacs in all PRs are correct? (*False* → *forged or tampered PR*)
- `result-hmac` of final result correct? (*False* → *forged or tampered result*)

## If **successful**: Final result is ...

- assumed to be correct under given trust assumptions
- authentic
- of integrity

## Next Steps

### Establishment of trust in CEs

- State: Predefined list of trusted CEs
- Ongoing: Reputation system
  - Clients exchange CE's reputation
  - Re-evaluation at random
  - PRs as not deniable proofs
  - Related: semantic web & dweb
- Future: Third-party certification

### User-Constrained Orchestration

- Issue: Client has no further options if network delivers an untrusted result
- Ongoing: Clients proactively constrain NFN's orchestration (i.e. exclude untrusted CEs)

## Next Steps

### Availability of Provenance Records

- Implementation State:
  - PR in NDN's signature field
  - Tampering-resistant append-only log (by CEs)
- Future:
  - Issue: Incentive to not deliver disadvantageous logs
  - Replication (e.g. clients, TTP)

### Faulty Primary Data

- Issue: Results derived from faulty primary data are faulty as well
- Future (NDN): Convention to flag authentic but faulty data (e.g. due to broken sensor)
- Future (NFN): Consideration in NFN result verification



## Conclusion

- **Context:** Services in (recursive) *read-process-republish mode* (e.g. NFN)
- **Challenge:** Result correctness & relaxation of trust
- **Approach:** Transparent provenance & provenance-based result verification
- **Future:** Trust in CEs, User-Constrained Orchestration, Availability of PRs