Practice and Theory of Incentives and Game Theory in Networked Systems

Call For Papers

Technical Program


FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 3

8:50-9:00 Welcoming Remarks

9:00-10:00 Invited Tutorial on Game Theory (Ramesh Johari, Stanford University)


10:00-10:30 Session 1: Experimental Study

Internet Congestion: A Laboratory Experiment (Full Paper)

Daniel Friedman (UCSC), Bernardo Huberman (HP Labs)

10:30-11:00 Break

11:00-12:30 Session 2: Incentives in Practice

Experiences Applying Game Theory to System Design (Full Paper)

Ratul Mahajan (U. Wash.), Maya Rodrig (U. Wash.),  David Wetherall (U. Wash.), John Zahorjan (U. Wash.)

Rethinking Incentives for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (Full Paper)
Elgan Huang (U. Cambridge), Jon Crowcroft (U. Cambridge), Ian Wassell (U.Cambridge)

On the Benefits and Feasibility of Incentive Based Routing Infrastructure (Full Paper)
Mike Afergan (MIT), John Wroclawski (MIT)

12:30-1:30 Lunch

1:30-2:30 Session 3: Working Papers

A Case for Taxation in Peer-to-Peer Streaming Broadcast (Working Paper)
Yang-hua Chu (CMU), John Chuang (UC Berkeley), Hui Zhang (CMU)

Near rationality and competitive equilibria in networked systems (Working Paper)
Nicolas Christin (UC Berkeley), Jens Grossklags (UC Berkeley), John Chuang(UC Berkeley)

Faithfulness in Internet Algorithms (Working Paper)

Jeff Shneidman (Harvard), David Parkes (Harvard), Laurent Massoulie (Microsoft Research)

2:30-3:00 Session 4: Theory and Models

Free-Riding and Whitewashing in Peer-to-Peer Systems (Full Paper)
Michal Feldman (UC Berkeley), Christos Papadimitriou (UC Berkeley), Ion Stoica (UC Berkeley), John Chuang (UC Berkeley)

3:00-3:30 Break

3:30-4:00 Session 4: Theory and Models (Continued)
On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting and transferring of jobs (Full Paper)
Herve Moulin (Rice)

4:00-5:00 Panel Discussion
David Clark (MIT), Joan Feigenbaum (Yale), John Ledyard (Caltech), David Wetherall (U. Washington)


 
 
Last Modified: February 11, 2004